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Abstract
In the literature on bank runs where depositors decide whether to with-
draw early from the bank or not based on the noisy signals they receive
about the future returns, a unique equilibrium is established with a thresh-
old level below which depositor would withdraw. However, these papers
assume precise information. In reality noise levels need not be very small.
The information that is available to the depositors can be endogenised.
This paper nds that to either minimise the probability of a bank-run or
maximise the expected utility of the depositors, there should be high trans-
parency of the bankslong term returns.
JEL Classications: C72, D82, G21, G28
Keywords: Bank runs, transparency, global game, self-fullling beliefs.
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1 Introduction
The literature on bank runs has gone through various developments over the last
two decades. We have the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model which says that
bank runs are caused by self fullling beliefs of depositors. This model has two
equilibria: the bank run equilibrium and the no bank run equilibrium. A crucial
break through was made to establish unique equilibrium using the global game
framework by Morris and Shin (1998) in a model of currency attacks. This paved
the way to many models on bank runs looking at di¤erent issues, establishing
a unique equilibrium where agents receive noisy signals about the fundamental
and decide whether to withdraw or not because of self fullling beliefs.1 The
fundamental gives information about the long term earning potential of the bank
and the proportion of early withdrawals, which in turn gives information about
the long term returns of the agents.
The noise reveals how informative the signal is about the true value of the fun-
damental. Lower the noise, higher the level of informativeness and transparency of
the signal. Upto now these models on bank runs assume precise information with
the range of noise close to zero. In reality it is possible to choose the amount of
information that is made available to the agents. Erland (2005) does an empirical
analysis of bank runs and nds that transparency increases nancial stability.
This paper attempts to nd the optimal level of transparency of the banks
1Morris and Shin(2002), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005 a, b), G. Selvaretnam (2005).
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future return that should be chosen for nancial stability and depositor welfare.
There are papers which have modelled transparency using the global game set up
for other issues, where self fullling beliefs play a role in the agentsdecisions.
Heinemann and Illing (2002) analyse how transparency a¤ects the probability of
speculative attacks on currency and nd that the likelihood of attacks reduces
with transparency. In a similar vein, Englmaier and Reisinger (2004) build a
model analysing the decision to invest and nd that transparency increases the
chances of industrialisation.
The model has a continuum of agents who are endowed with one unit which
is invested in a bank which operates in a competitive environment. A known
fraction of the depositors are impatient, who are hit by a liquidity shock and have
to withdraw early. The bank keeps reserves just su¢ cient to meet the demand
of the impatient agents and invests the balance in a long-term project. If patient
agents who are not hit by the liquidity shock want to withdraw early, the bank
can get a loan which has to be repaid with an interest. Early withdrawers receive
returns of one unit. The choice variables in this model are the noise level and the
interest rate on the loan that is taken to meet the demand of early withdrawals.
First we look at the case where the decision regarding both these variables are
in the hands of the authorities in charge of the nancial system in the country.
Hence the objective is to minimise the probability of bank runs. They can impose
rules about how much information should be divulged to the depositors. We solve
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for the noise level that minimises the probability of bank runs. The next section
determines the level of noise that maximises the expected utilty of the depositors,
which is an obvious objective of banks which operate in a competitive market.
It is found that for both objectives, noise should be very small (i.e. high level of
transparency). If the noise is very large, it means that the private information is of
no value and therefore the depositors dont act on it. If there is to be information,
it is better to make it as transparent as possible. It is also found that the bank
should have access to loans at minimum cost (i.e. no interest) to meet the demand
of patient agents who decide to withdraw because of self-fullling beliefs. This
supports the concept of deposit insurance which is advocated by Sachs (1998),
Radelet and Sachs (1998).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, the model is
set up, followed by section 3 where the unique equilibrium is established. Section
4 looks at the results when the probability of bank runs is minimised while section
5 looks at the results when the expected utility of the agents is maximised and
section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are three periods (t0; t1; t2) and a continuum [0,1] of agents who are the
depositors, and one bank operating in a competitive environment. Each agent
is endowed with one unit at the beginning of t0 which is invested in the bank.
Consumption happens only in periods t1 and t2. All agents are identical and risk
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averse, and each agents utility funcion is strictly concave, increasing and twice
continuously di¤erentiable.
A fraction  of the agents are hit by a liquidity shock in t1, which requires
them to denitely withdraw early. They are referred to as the impatient agents
and those who are not hit by the liquidity shock are called the patient agents. If
the agents decide to withdraw in t1 they will receive an early return of 1. The
depositors might also want to withdraw early because they believe that if they
dont, they might end up losing their investment in the bank because su¢ ciently
large number of agents decide to withdraw early.
The bank keeps  as reserves to meet the demand of impatient agents and
invests the money that is deposited in a long term project. Each unit that has
been invested till t2 realises a random return .
If the patient agents want to withdraw early in t1, the bank borrows from
an outside party what is needed. This loan has to be settled with interest, so
that each unit that is borrowed will have to be repaid with L ( 1). Because
the loan will be from an institution which has the welfare of the nancial system
in consideration, it is assumed that the bank will receive all the money that is
needed.
Those who do not withdraw in t1 will have to share equally what is left of the
earnings from the long term project after the loan is settled (if there is anything
left to share) in t2.
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We assume that the economic fundamental  is uncertain and is drawn from
a uniform distribution on

; 

where  = 0 and  very large. In t1 each agent
i observes a noisy signal i =  + i of the economic fundamental . The noise
i is uniformly and independently distributed among the depositors with support
( e;+e):
Once the agents observe the signal, they will decide whether to withdraw in
t1 or wait till t2. This decision is based on their beliefs about  and the number
of agents who would withdraw in t1. A threshold 
 can be established where, a
player withdraws if and only if he observes a i less than 
 in t1. Lower the 
,
lower the probability of a bank run.
The crucial point of this paper is that the range of the noise level, e, is a choice
variable that can be chosen by the bank or the regulators. Lower the noise, e,
higher the transparency or information available to the agents about their long
term return.
Keeping with this strand of literature it is assumed that the fundamental  has
an upper dominant region and lower dominant region so that a unique equilibrium
can be established. If  was such that no patient agent withdraws, the return to
the agent by not withdrawing is . If  is su¢ ciently low such that u () < u (1) ;
it is better to withdraw early even if no other agent withdraws. If player is signal
is i < 1  e, he will denitely withdraw.
On the other hand there could be a range of  which is so high that even if
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everyone else withdraws it is better for an agent not to withdraw. If everyone else
withdraws, by waiting he will receive u (   L). If u (   L) > u (1) the agent is
better o¤ by not withdrawing. which means that if the signal he receives is i >
1+L+e he will denitely not withdraw. When computing  we only consider the
range [   e;  + e] and assume that the dominant regions are extreme enough.
2.1 Threshold level 
We can compute a threshold level of  where if any player observes a value less
than  in t1 he will withdraw. Once the economic fundamental  is realised, each
player i receives a signal i = + i. The strategy for player i can be mapped out
as;
si :
h

s
  e;e + ei! fwithdraw, not withdrawg;
We consider threshold strategies and set out the conditions for  to be a
symmetric equilibrium. The threshold strategy for each player would be
si = withdraw if i < 

i
= not withdraw if i > 

i :
Symmetric threshold strategy would mean i = 
 for every player i.
If i > 
; agent i believes that the banks investment is doing su¢ ciently well
and large enough proportion of the depositors believe the same and would not
withdraw. Whereas if i < 
; agent i believes that su¢ ciently high proportion of
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depositors believe (as he) that they should withdraw because they feel that they
would lose out if they waited.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold level of the fundamental  such that a
patient agent will withdraw if and only if he observes a signal less than .
Proof. Let the agents withdraw early if they receive a signal less than b.
Player i who observes signal i has a posterior distribution of  that is given
by y (= =i). We know that y is then uniformly distributed on [i   e; i + e]
where each of the points is realised with equal probability 1
2e
. In turn he will
believe that each of the point y 2 [i   e; i + e] would have given out signals to
the other agents (y   e; y + e) meaning the proportion of patient agents who he
believes would withdraw would be a distribution given by e! (y) 2 [0; 1] :
yb   e; e! = 1:
b   e< y < b + e; e! = b   (y   e)
2e
:
yb + e; e! = 0:
If a patient agent who observes i = 
 withdraws in t1 he will denitely receive
one unit.
If the agent waits till t2 will receive either nothing or,
  + (1  ) y   (1  ) e!L
(1  ) (1  e!) =

y   e!L
1  e!

:
The agent will never receive a negative return.
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If y < e!Li.e. y < (b+e)L
L+2e

, he believes he will receive nothing in the last
period.
If y > e!Li.e. y > (b+e)L
L+2e

, he believes he will receive y e!L
1 e! in the last period.
The di¤erence in expected utility from withdrawing and not withdrawing,
given signal i is given by:
g

i;b = EU(withdraw=i)  EU(not withdraw=i):
g (i) = u (1) 
Z i+e
(b+e)L
L+2e
1
2e
u

y   e! (y)  L
1  e! (y)

dy: (1)
g : R! R:
It is clear that Lim
i!
g > 0 and Lim
i!
g < 0.
Over the range of the integral, u(:) is non negative.
dg
di
=   1
2e
u
 
i + e  b i2e  L
1  b i
2e
!
: (2)
Because g (:) is continuous in i and decreasing we can conclude that there
exists a unique point where g () = 0, so that the agent who receives a signal
i = 
 will be indi¤erent between withdrawing and not withdrawing early.
3 Minimising the Probability of Bank Runs
The authorities who are interested in the nancial stability of the country would
be concerned about minimising the probability of bank runs. If they can determine
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the level of noise and the interest that has to be paid to the lenders, it is reasonable
to assume that they would choose noise, e and loan repayment, L to minimise .
This however, may or may not be in the best interest of the depositors. We look
at the optimal choices which maximise the expected utility of the depositors in
the next section.
Proposition 2 below is central to this paper which says that transparency
reduces the probability of bank runs. This is supported by the empirical analysis
in Erland (2005).
Proposition 2 The probability of a bank-run is minimised when the noise level
e is at a minimum.
Proof. The agent is indi¤erent between withdrawing and not withdrawing
when he receives a signal i = 
:
We use equation 1 which gives the indi¤erence condition:
h ( (e; L)) = 1  1
2e
Z +e
(+e)L
L+2e
u

y   e! (y)  L
1  e! (x)

dy: (3)
Keep in mind that e! = 0 when  = +e; e! = 1 when  =  e and e! = +e
2e+L
when  = (
+e)L
2e+L
:
@h
@e
=  
2e  u ( + e)  2 R +e(+e)L
L+2e
u

y e!(y)L
1 e!(y)

dy
4e2
: (4)
When y =  + e, u

y e!(y)L
1 e!(y)

= u ( + e).
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Therefore we can say that 2e u ( + e) < 2 R +e(+e)L
L+2e
u

y e!(y)L
1 e!(y)

dy as long as
e is su¢ ciently small. This means,
@h
@e
> 0:
@h
@
=   1
2e
u

 + e  0  L
1  e! ( + e)

 1 + 1
2e
u
0B@ (+e)LL+2e    
(+e)L
L+2e
+e
2e
 L
1  
  (+e)L
L+2e
+e
2e
1CA  L
L+ 2e
:
(5)
This reduces to,
@h
@
=   1
2e
u ( + e) < 0: (6)
Therefore when e is small enough
d
de
> 0:
Therefore to minimise , noise level e should be very low. When there is
nearly full transparency (e! 0), the probability of bank run is minimised.
If noise is very small, the signal each agent receives is very close to the true
value. However, if the authorities are unable to have much transparency, should
we have large noise? If the noise is very large, depositors cant learn anything from
their private signals and therefore would not consider it when making decisions.
Because it is di¢ cult to prevent some information oating around, this model
recommends that there should be very clear transparence of information about
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the banks long term return (i.e. very small level of noise) if probability of bank
runs is to be minimised.
Proposition 3 below says that a bank run is minimised when L = 1: This means
that the banks should have interest-free loans to meet the demand of self fullling
withdrawals. This result is quite obvious and trivial. Lower the amount that
should be repaid to the lender, higher the returns for those who wait. Therefore
to minimise the probability of a bank run, L should be as less as possible. In this
case, it will be L = 1 so that the banks should have access to interest-free loans
to meet the demand of self-fullling withdrawals.
This supports the concept of deposit insurance shown in Allen and Gale (1998),
Sachs (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998) where there is a lender of last resort,
which would prevent self fullling bank runs. However, there are other papers,
Cooper and Ross (2002), Schwartz (1998), Calomoris (1998), which warn that
having deposit insurance schemes or lender of last resort would give rise to moral
hazard where the banks would be irresponsible in their investment. So, to have
the advantage of the interest free loan, the banks need to be regulated so that
they keep reserves that are at least su¢ cient for the impatient withdrawers.
Proposition 3 The probability of a bank run is minimised when L = 1.
Proof. We use the indi¤erence condition in equation 3.
d
dL
=  
@h
@L
@h
@
:
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We know that @h
@ < 0:
@h
@L
=+u
0B@ (+e)LL+2e    
(+e)L
L+2e
+e
2e
 L
1  
  (+e)L
L+2e
+e
2e
1CA  2e ( + e)
(L+ 2e)2
(7)
 
Z +e
(+e)L
L+2e
u0 (:)

  e! (y)
1  e! (y)

dy:
This reduces to,
@h
@L
=  
Z +e
(+e)L
L+2e
u0

y   e! (y)  L
1  e! (y)

  e! (y)
1  e! (y)

dy > 0: (8)
Therefore d

dL
> 0:
4 Maximising the Expected Utility of Agents
In this section we nd the results when the objective is to maximise the expected
utility of the depositors. The bank would want to do that because it operates in
a competitive market. The expected utility of an agent is given by equation 9.
EU =
1
   
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
u (1)+
(1  )
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
R  e

u (1) d + +e
R 
u
 

1 

d
+
R +e
 e (! ()  u (1)) d+
0BBBBBB@
R (+e)L
2e+L
 e
(1  ! ())  0d
+
R +e
(+e)L
2e+L
(1  ! ())  u

 !()L
(1 )1 !()

d
1CCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (9)
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The probability of  being at any point is ex ante 1
  . With  probability
the agent can be hit by the liquidity shock and have to withdraw early. In which
case, he gets u(1).
With (1  ) probability he will not be hit by the liquidity shock. The rst
term is when  <   e, so that all the depositors would withdraw early in t1 and
receive early return of 1 for sure. The second term is when  >  + e, so that all
the patient depositors would wait till t2 and therefore the entire earning, ; will
be distributed among the patient depositors.
When  is between    e and  + e we have a partial run where the agent
might have to either run or not run. There is ! () probability that an agent
would run and (1  ! ()) probability that he would not run. If he does run he
will receive utility of 1 unit. But if he does not run, he could either receive nothing
(if too many depositors had withdrawn early) or u

 !L
(1 !)(1 )

.
The proportion of agents who run can be looked at in three categories.
! = 0 if  >  + e. When  is big enough no patient agent will run.
! = 1 if  <    e When  is low enough everyone will run.
! = 
 +e
2e
if    e    + e. This is when there will be a partial run.
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Now we come to the other key result in the paper. According to proposition
4 the expected utility of the agents is maximised if there is high transparency of
information.
Proposition 4 To maximise the expected utility of the depositors, the level of
noise e should be minimised.
Proof. The expected utility of an agent given in equation 9 can be rearranged
as follows:
EU =

   u (1) +
1  
   
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@

R  e
u (1) d + +e
R 
u
 

1 

d
+  e
R +e
! ()u (1) d
+ (+e)L
2e+L
R +e
u

 !()L
(1 )(1 !())

d+
  (+e)L
2e+L
R +e
! ()u

 !()L
(1 )(1 !())

d
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (10)
Detailed workings of dEU
de
is in the appendix.
dEU
de
=
1
   
0BB@ Z +e(+e)L
2e+L

   
2e2
0BB@ u
0(:)( L)
(1 )(1 !())
 u

 !()L
(1 )(1 !())

1CCA d
1CCA : (11)
Because u(c) > cu0(:);
u

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

>

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

u0

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

:
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Therefore,
u

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

>

   L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

u0

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

:
It is clear that dEU
de
< 0.
Therefore to maximise EU , noise e should be at a minimum.
When the agents have good information about the long term return, they can
take an informed decision in t1 whether to withdraw early or not. Partial runs are
minimised. We have also seen that this would minimise the probability of bank
runs as well which also contributes to the increase in expected utility.
The next proposition is not surprising, which says the less we give the lender,
the better for the agents. This shows that an existence of an institution prepared
to lend what is necessary to early withdrawers can reduce bank runs and be
benecial to depositors. It would probably may not even have to give out money
in t1 because people will not want to withdraw early any way.
Proposition 5 Expected utility of the depositors is maximised when the repayable
amount to the lender L = 1.
Proof. We use the expected utility as given in equation 9 above:
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dEU
dL
=
1  
   
0BB@ d

dL
  d
dL
u
 
+e
1 

d + 0  d
dL
+ d

dL
u
 
+e
1 

d   0
+ (+e)L
2e+L
R +e d
dL

(1  ! ())u

 !()L
(1 )(1 !())

d:
1CCA (12)
=
1  
   
 
(+e)L
2e+L
Z +e d
dL

(1  ! ())u

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

d:
!
The return that remains for late withdrawers, (1  ! ())u

 !()L
(1 )(1 !())

; re-
duces when the L increases.
Therefore dEU
dL
< 0 which means, to maximise expected utility, L should be at
a minimum.
5 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to throw some light about the level of transparency that
banks should have in the context of bank runs. When depositors are exposed to
noisy signals about the future returns of a bank, the probability of bank runs and
their expected returns depend on the level of noise. Most literature in this area
of research assume noise to be very small. However in reality the level of noise
di¤ers depending on bank policies, bank regulatorspolicies, education level of
agents which a¤ect how much they can interpret the information they receive etc.
Higher the noise level, higher the probability of partial runs. If the probability of
a partial run is big enough, it should be taken into consideration in the analysis.
This model recommends high transparency to maximise the expected utility of
the depositors and to minimise the probability of bank runs.
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A Appendix
EU =
1
   
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
u (1)+
(1  )
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
R  e

u (1) d + +e
R 
u
 

1 

d
+
R +e
 e (! ()  u (1)) d+
0BBBBBB@
R (+e)L
2e+L
 e
(1  ! ())  0d
+
R +e
(+e)L
2e+L
(1  ! ())  u

 !()L
(1 )1 !()

d
1CCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
Recall that ! is zero when  = + e; and 1 when  =   e; and (+e)
2e+L
when
 = (
+e)L
2e+L
:
Keep in mind the following:
d!
de
=
   
2e2
:
d
de
u

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

=
u0 (:)
(1  )
 
(1  !) ( L) d!
de
+ (   !L) d!
de
(1  !)2
!
=
u0 (:)
 
 
2e2

(   L)
(1  ) (1  !)2 :
d
de
!u

   ! ()  L
(1  ) (1  ! ())

= u (:)
   
2e2
+ !
u0 (:)
 
 
2e2

L (   1)
(1  ) (1  ! ())2 :
Therefore
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dEU
de
=
1
   
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 1  u   +e
1 

+ 0 + 1 +  e
R +e  
2e2
d + u

+e
(1 )

  0
+ (+e)L
2e+L
R +e u0(:)  2e2 ( L)
(1 )(1 !())2 d + 0 + 0
  (+e)L
2e+L
R +e
u (:)  

2e2
+ !
u0(:)

 
2e2

( L)
(1 )(1 !())2

d
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
(13)
dEU
de
=
1
   
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
 e
R +e  
2e2
d
+ (+e)L
2e+L
R +e u0(:)  2e2 ( L)
(1 )(1 !())2 d
  (+e)L
2e+L
R +e
u (:)  

2e2
+ !
u0(:)

 
2e2

( L)
(1 )(1 !())2

d
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (14)
dEU
de
=
1
   
0BB@ Z +e(+e)L
2e+L

   
2e2
0BB@ u
0(:)( L)
(1 )(1 !())
 u

 !()L
(1 )(1 !())

1CCA d
1CCA : (15)
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